Only about two-thirds of US mothers with young children are in the labour force. For many low-income married mothers, taking a job barely pays: most face participation tax rates above 25%, rising to 60% once childcare costs are counted. This column argues that lifting the caps on the childcare credit and basing the Earned Income Tax Credit on the primary earner’s income alone would each raise maternal employment. Together, they could raise it by almost 13 points, from 59% to 72%. Both reforms largely pay for themselves.
Mothers’ labour force participation remains a weak spot of the US labour market. In 2025, only 68% of mothers with children under six were in the labour force, against more than 90% of fathers (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2026). Childcare costs are a central part of the problem, and they are back on the policy agenda. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act of July 2025 raised the top rate of the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit from 35% to 50%, effective 2026. The caps on eligible expenses, however, remain unchanged at $3,000 for one child and $6,000 for two or more.
Children account for much of the remaining gender gap in the labour market, with large and persistent child penalties in earnings, especially in English-speaking countries (Kleven et al. 2019). Policy design matters for these gaps. Joint taxation and other marriage-related provisions discourage married women’s labour supply (Bick et al. 2018, Borella et al. 2019), while work-conditioned child-related transfers raise it (Guner et al. 2017). Better access to childcare can raise maternal employment, including among lower-educated mothers (Carta and Rizzica 2018, Hermes et al. 2023), and differences in child-related transfers help explain why mothers’ employment varies across countries (Hannusch 2025).
Low-income married families sit where these forces meet. In these families, the husband typically already works, often for modest pay, so a second income means paying more tax, losing benefits, and covering childcare. In recent research (Garstenauer and Siassi 2026), we quantify how much this discourages these mothers from working, and whether simple changes to existing tax credits could close a meaningful part of the maternal employment gap.
For many mothers, working barely pays
Our population of interest is married couples with children in which neither spouse holds a college degree – roughly one in five US adults aged 20 to 50. In this group, only 59% of mothers are employed, while nearly all fathers work.
A natural summary of the incentives these mothers face is the participation tax rate: the share of a mother’s earnings that the household loses through higher taxes and lower transfers when she takes up work rather than staying at home. In our model, this rate exceeds 25% for most mothers and is highest for those whose husbands earn little. Once the childcare costs of working are added, the participation tax rate can reach 60%.
Income and payroll taxes account for the largest part (Figure 1), since joint filing taxes the second earner’s first dollar at the household’s marginal rate. The second-largest contributor is the Earned Income Tax Credit – a programme designed to encourage work. Because the credit depends on the couple’s combined earnings, her income can push the family into the credit’s phase-out range or out of eligibility altogether (see also Eissa and Hoynes 2006). This penalty is largest for couples with low earnings. Means-tested food and cash assistance programmes add a little more, while the Child Tax Credit and the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit offset only a small part.
Figure 1 Decomposition of married mothers’ participation tax rates


Notes: The participation tax rate is the share of a mother’s gross earnings that the household loses through higher taxes and lower transfers when she moves from non-employment to employment, holding her husband’s earnings fixed.
A model with heterogeneous childcare needs
To evaluate reforms, we build a life-cycle model in which married couples face uninsurable wage shocks and decide how much to work and save. Fathers choose whether to work; mothers choose whether to work and for how many hours. Two features set it apart from earlier work. First, mothers’ human capital grows while they work and erodes while they are out of the labour force, so leaving work has lasting costs. Second, childcare needs differ widely: some couples can rely on grandparents or neighbours, while others face substantial bills for formal care.
The model also embeds the main US tax and transfer programmes in detail, with all their kinks and phase-outs. Calibrated to data from the Current Population Survey, the model reproduces untargeted patterns of maternal employment by number and age of children, the earnings distribution, and childcare spending across incomes.
Two simple reforms raise maternal employment
The first reform removes the caps on the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit and lets couples claim 100% of their childcare expenses as a (non-refundable) tax credit. Relative to median income, the current caps are a fraction of what they were in 1976, when the credit was introduced, and the 2025 reform left them untouched. Removing them raises mothers’ employment in our model by about 6 percentage points, from 59% to 65% (Figure 2). The effect is concentrated in families with preschool children, where employment rises by almost 10 points, and among the better-off couples in our sample: families with high childcare needs and no informal alternatives, who currently send only one parent to work even when both could earn reasonable wages.
The second reform exempts the second earner’s earnings when calculating the Earned Income Tax Credit, so that eligibility and the size of the credit depend only on the higher-earning spouse’s earnings. It raises mothers’ employment by a similar amount, to 66%. Unlike the childcare reform, its effects are spread evenly regardless of children’s ages, and the reform mainly benefits couples in which the husband earns little – precisely those for whom the current Earned Income Tax Credit penalty is largest.
Figure 2 Married mothers’ employment rate in the benchmark and under each reform


Notes: Model-simulated employment rates of married mothers. Reform 1 removes the caps on the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit (CDCTC) and makes 100% of childcare expenses creditable; Reform 2 bases the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) on the higher earner’s earnings only.
The two reforms reach different families, which makes them complements. As Figure 3 shows, the childcare reform lowers mothers’ participation tax rates mainly in couples where the husband earns more than about $40,000; the Earned Income Tax Credit reform, mainly in lower-income couples. Combined, they cut the participation tax rate at every level of husbands’ earnings – by about 11 percentage points on average. Instead of losing one in every four dollars she earns, a mother entering work would lose about one in seven. As a result, married mothers’ employment rises from 59% to 72%.
Figure 3 Reduction in married mothers’ participation tax rates under each reform


Notes: Reduction in married mothers’ participation tax rates relative to the benchmark (in percentage points), as a function of their husbands’ annual earnings. CDCTC: Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit; EITC: Earned Income Tax Credit.
The reforms largely pay for themselves
Both reforms raise spending on tax credits substantially. Yet in the long run, both largely pay for themselves within our population. Three forces offset the direct cost: dual-earner couples pay more income and payroll tax; they draw less from means-tested programmes; and mothers who stay in work accumulate human capital, so they earn – and pay taxes on – higher wages later in life.
Each reform, and especially their combination, raises welfare for couples entering the economy by more than 1% of lifetime consumption in the combined case. The childcare reform benefits higher-productivity couples most, the Earned Income Tax Credit reform lower-productivity couples, and the combination delivers fairly even gains.
Implications for policy
Our findings fit a broader pattern in the literature. Guner et al. (2020) find that a larger, fully refundable childcare credit raises married women’s participation. Low et al. (2018) show that time limits on out-of-work welfare raised single mothers’ employment, but left the least advantaged women with less support. Our results suggest that strengthening in-work credits can achieve similar employment gains without cutting support for the families who need it most.
The 2025 increase in the Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit rate is a step in the right direction, but it does not address the two features that matter most for low-income married mothers: expense caps far below what families with young children pay, and an Earned Income Tax Credit whose joint-earnings base penalises the second earner. Both can be fixed with simple changes to the tax code, at little net cost to the government.
The lessons extend beyond the US. In-work tax credits in France and New Zealand are also based on household earnings, and childcare credits in Belgium, France, and Spain cap allowable expenses. Wherever second earners face such implicit taxes, making existing tax credits work for the families they are meant to help may be one of the cheapest ways to bring more mothers into work.
Source : VOXeu








































































