A barrage of transportation disruptions has affected the global economy in recent years. This column examines how transportation bottlenecks interact with aggregate shocks, comparing the Commodity Supercycle of the 2000s and the post-pandemic Great Supply Chain Disruption. The spike in freight rates for dry bulk shipping in the former episode was due to scarce shipping capacity, while the latter stemmed from scarce port capacity. Shipping prices rise dramatically when transportation capacity is scarce, while port prices remain much more stable. The constraint matters: when ships are scarce, shipowners have strong incentives to order new vessels, but addressing port scarcity may require government intervention.
A barrage of transportation disruptions has affected the global economy in recent years, from the Great Supply Chain Disruption following the COVID-19 pandemic to disruptions in the Red Sea, environmental shocks in critical waterways, and recent tensions around the Strait of Hormuz. The transportation sector, which seemed to carry international trade seamlessly during much of the era of globalisation, has repeatedly emerged as a critical bottleneck. This has happened against a backdrop of large increases in prices and recurring shortages, raising a natural question: how much do transportation disruptions matter in the aggregate, and when do they matter?
Maritime transportation is a natural place to look. Ships carry more than 80% of world trade in goods, and transportation accounts for a substantial part of the time required to move inputs across countries. Alessandria et al. (2023), for instance, show that increases in shipping delays raise prices, cause stockouts, and reduce economic activity. Bai et al. (2024) and Ostry et al. (2022) find that increases in shipping costs pass through to inflation. Dunn and Leibovici (2025) have highlighted how disruptions in the Red Sea can reduce effective shipping capacity, and Baslandze and Fuchs (2026) have shown delivery shortfalls can propagate into consumer prices through firms’ pricing decisions.
In recent work (Brancaccio et al. 2026), we study how transportation bottlenecks interact with aggregate shocks. A disruption that has limited aggregate effects when the transportation system has spare capacity can propagate widely through the economy when ships or ports are already operating close to their limits.
A transportation sector with limited capacity to adjust
Our analysis focuses on dry bulk shipping, which transports raw materials such as coal, grain, and iron ore. Dry bulk shipping accounts for roughly one-third of global seaborne trade by volume, and dry bulk carriers account for about 43% of the world fleet’s carrying capacity. Two components determine the sector’s capacity: port infrastructure and the shipping fleet. We provide evidence that both are rigid in the short run.
Port capacity expands only slowly. When demand rises, ports cannot quickly add berths, cranes, or storage space. In the data, this rigidity shows up in a simple way: when demand at a port increases, the number of ships being serviced simultaneously changes relatively little, while the queue outside the port grows sharply.
The fleet is similarly difficult to expand. Shipbuilding takes several years, and ships are already used intensively. Existing vessels are active more than 90% of the time on average, leaving little reserve capacity that can be activated when demand rises.
Shipping markets display a striking pattern: freight rates are stable for long stretches and then spike. Rigidities in transportation offer a natural explanation. When the system has slack, extra demand is absorbed by putting idle capacity to work. When it does not, extra demand creates a shortage, and because capacity cannot expand quickly, rates adjust sharply.
Dry bulk shipping saw two pronounced episodes over the past two decades – the 2000s Commodity Supercycle and the Great Supply Chain Disruption after COVID-19 – in which rates rose several-fold before eventually falling back. Then, the question is whether these episodes reflected genuinely scarce transportation capacity, and if so, where the bottleneck was.
Measuring transportation capacity
To answer this, we model maritime transportation as a queueing network. A shipment must first find a ship. It then has to enter a port, where it may wait before being loaded, and finally the vessel must travel to its destination. Each stage can limit how much trade the transportation system can handle.
The framework therefore produces two potential bottlenecks. One comes from ports, where capacity depends on port infrastructure and service times. The other comes from ships, where capacity depends on the size of the fleet but also on how long ships remain occupied travelling or waiting at ports.
The capacity of the transportation system is determined by whichever of these two constraints is tighter. This delivers a simple measure of capacity based on observable objects: port infrastructure, port service times, the number of ships, and travel distances. Because these variables are widely available, the measure can be constructed over time and used to gauge how much slack exists in the transportation sector.
This framework also helps explain the behaviour of shipping prices. When transportation capacity is slack, freight rates equal the marginal cost of shipping. Moreover, changes in port capacity or fleet size have little effect on prices or trade. Once transportation capacity binds, however, the quantity that can be transported is capped. Freight rates then rise to clear the market, generating the observed spikes. That distinction turns out to be important for understanding both the Great Supply Chain Disruption and the 2000s Commodity Supercycle.
The Great Supply Chain Disruption: Ports became the bottleneck
As shown in Figure 1, between 2013 and 2020, the transportation system generally had spare capacity. Starting in 2021, this changed. COVID-related labour restrictions and other disruptions increased port service times. At the same time, demand for raw materials rose sharply. Effective port capacity declined, and by 2021, the port constraint became binding for several quarters.
Figure 1 The Great Supply Chain Disruption: Transportation capacity (Qmax), quantity traded (Q), and the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), 2013-2023


The effect on commodity markets was sizeable. In a counterfactual in which transportation capacity is sufficiently high that the constraint does not bind, commodity price inflation between 2019 and 2021–23 is about three percentage points lower, accounting for roughly 13% of the observed increase.
But the story is more complicated than it seems. On top of the higher demand and the port disruptions, a contraction in commodity supply due to lockdowns, mine closures, and later the war in Ukraine also affected commodity prices.
This interaction matters. The contraction in commodity supply reduced the amount that needed to be transported and therefore partly alleviated pressure on the transportation sector. In a counterfactual without the negative supply shock, commodity prices remain almost as high because the additional production cannot be moved through the already-constrained system. Only when both the supply shock and the transportation constraint are removed does the price increase fall substantially – by 72% – while trade rises by almost 50%.
The implication is that transportation capacity can shape the transmission of other aggregate shocks. When transportation is the binding constraint, expanding commodity supply alone may do relatively little to lower prices because the additional output cannot reach consumers.
The Commodity Supercycle: Ships were scarce
The Commodity Supercycle of the 2000s provides a useful contrast. China’s rapid industrialisation and urbanisation generated a major increase in demand for raw materials such as iron ore and coal. Trade expanded sharply, but this time, the relevant bottleneck was not port infrastructure. It was the fleet.
Figure 2 The Commodity Supercycle: Transportation capacity (Qmax), quantity traded (Q), and the Baltic Dry Index (BDI), 2004-2009


Shipbuilding takes years, so the number of vessels could not adjust quickly enough to the increase in demand. The ship constraint became binding and freight rates rose dramatically. Counterfactual simulations suggest that insufficient transportation capacity accounted for as much as 23% of the increase in commodity prices between 2007 and mid-2008.
High freight rates induced a large wave of ship orders (Kalouptsidi 2014). But because of long construction lags, much of this new capacity arrived only after the boom had ended. The dry bulk fleet subsequently expanded dramatically, and the ship constraint did not bind again in the later part of the sample.
The comparison between the two episodes is therefore informative. During the Commodity Supercycle, the scarce factor was ships. During the Great Supply Chain Disruption, it was ports. Both generated high freight rates and higher commodity prices, but the source of the bottleneck – and therefore the relevant policy response – was different.
Transportation resilience and investment
The broader lesson is that transportation infrastructure can have aggregate consequences. What matters is not simply whether the sector experiences a disruption, but whether that disruption pushes the system against its capacity. This also changes how resilience should be measured. A transportation system with substantial slack may absorb a large disruption with relatively modest aggregate effects. A much smaller disruption can be consequential when capacity is already exhausted.
The distinction between ships and ports also matters for investment incentives. A striking feature of the data is that shipping prices rise dramatically when transportation capacity is scarce, while port prices remain much more stable – even when ports themselves are the bottleneck. This means that congestion rents are captured differently across the two parts of the system. When ships are scarce, shipowners benefit directly from higher freight rates and have strong incentives to order new vessels. When ports are scarce, the port itself may capture relatively little of the resulting scarcity rent, particularly given the semi-public ownership structure of many ports.
As a result, there may be strong private incentives to invest in ships but weaker incentives to expand port infrastructure. This creates potentially important policy implications for port investment (Brancaccio et al. 2025) and port pricing, as explored in Brancaccio et al. (n.d.).
Transportation bottlenecks are therefore more than local logistics problems. They are a channel through which demand, supply, geopolitical, and infrastructure shocks can affect aggregate prices and trade. The relevant question for policymakers is not simply whether transportation has been disrupted. It is whether the system still has slack – and, when it does not, where the binding constraint lies.
Source : VOXeu








































































