An increasing number of central banks have begun disclosing reserve currency shares. This column introduces a new public database providing information on the reserve currency composition of 149 countries across 23 currencies, covering the period 1999 to 2026, which allows a granular analysis of the factors driving reserve currency composition. Liquidity, return, and safety are the determinants most frequently cited when explaining allocation decisions. While central banks rarely acknowledge it publicly, a growing body of evidence also suggests a role for geopolitical considerations and international alliances.
Central banks’ holdings of foreign exchange reserves are a key component of the international monetary system and play an essential role in exchange rate arrangements, international payments, and capital flows around the world. Today, geopolitical tensions, financial sanctions and reserve diversification have renewed interest in whether the US dollar’s dominance will persist or whether a more multipolar international monetary system will emerge (ECB 2026).
Historically, most central banks have not disclosed the currency composition of their foreign exchange reserves. More recently, however, an increasing number of central banks have begun disclosing reserve currency shares in their annual reports and other official publications.
In a recent paper (Harr 2026), I present what is, to the best of my knowledge, the most comprehensive and detailed public database on the currency composition of countries’ foreign exchange reserves, constructed entirely from publicly available sources. Covering the period from the introduction of the euro in 1999 to 2026, the database provides information on the reserve currency composition of 149 countries across 23 currencies. By comparison, the database compiled by Laser et al. (2024) covers 64 countries and seven reserve currencies and was, to the best of my knowledge, previously the largest publicly available database of its kind. The richness of the database enables a granular analysis of the factors driving reserve currency composition, thereby shedding new light on the likely evolution of the international monetary system.
Over the sample period, I find that more countries increased their US dollar share than reduced it. By contrast, since the introduction of the euro, more countries have reduced their euro share than increased it.1 This should be compared with the IMF’s COFER data, which show that the US dollar’s share of global foreign exchange reserves has declined since the turn of the century, while the euro’s share has remained broadly stable. The difference arises because, unlike the IMF COFER data, I assign equal weight to each country, meaning that reserve compositions are not weighted by the size of countries’ foreign exchange reserves. Weighting countries according to the size of their foreign exchange reserves is the appropriate approach when analysing developments in global foreign exchange reserves. However, when studying central banks’ behaviour and the factors that shape their reserve allocation decisions, equal weighting across countries provides, in my view, a more representative picture of central bank behaviour (see also Goldberg and Hannaoui 2026).
I identify three distinct periods in the evolution of foreign currency reserve holdings: the 2000s, the 2010s, and the 2020s. As shown in Figure 1, the average US dollar share declined during the 2000s, recovered in the 2010s following the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–09, and has remained broadly stable in the 2020s. Over 1999–2025, US dollar shares fell in Europe, increased in Africa, Asia-Pacific, and North America, and remained broadly stable in South America.2
Figure 1 Cumulative change in global USD share
Average euro holdings increased during the 2000s following the introduction of the common currency but declined throughout the 2010s before stabilizing toward the end of the decade and in the 2020s (Figure 2). Over the period 1999–2025, average euro shares declined in every region except North America.
Figure 2 Cumulative change in global EUR share
Average reserve holdings of the Chinese renminbi have risen throughout the 2010s and 2020s. Although average renminbi holdings remain modest, they surpass those of the Japanese yen in South America and Africa and is close to doing so in Asia.
Figure 3 Cumulative change in global CNY share
Despite a post-GFC recovery, the average share of Japanese yen holdings declined across all regions between 1999 and 2025, with the sharpest fall in Asia-Pacific and North America. Sterling remains widely held, but its average reserve share has declined despite recent stabilisation. The Australian dollar and the Canadian dollar have gained prominence, although growth in Australian dollar holdings has levelled off since the mid-2010s.
Several large reserve holders in Asia-Pacific have diversified significantly into non-SDR currencies since the GFC.3 Non-SDR currency shares are particularly high in Malaysia, Indonesia, India, Singapore, and China. A growing group of smaller currencies is held by reserve managers across multiple regions, including the Swiss franc, New Zealand dollar, Korean won, Norwegian krone, Swedish krona, Danish krone, Singapore dollar, and Czech Koruna.
Liquidity, return, and safety are, in that order, the determinants most frequently cited by central banks when explaining their reserve currency allocation decisions among those that publicly disclose such information and are included in the database. This hierarchy is broadly consistent with the guidelines set out in IMF (2013) and the framework of Borio et al. (2008). One notable difference, however, is that both studies rank safety ahead of return, whereas central banks in the database cite return more frequently than safety. Other commonly cited determinants include the exchange rate regime, diversification objectives, external debt, trade patterns, payment needs, foreign exchange intervention, and the currency composition of liabilities (see Figure 4). These considerations are consistent with research highlighting the roles of safe assets, financial linkages, and trade invoicing patterns (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012, Gopinath and Stein 2018, Iancu et al. 2020). Finally, while central banks rarely acknowledge it publicly, a growing body of evidence also suggests that geopolitical considerations and international alliances may influence reserve currency allocations.
Figure 4 What central banks say about foreign exchange allocations
In the 2000s, shifts in reserve allocations may have been shaped by optimism about the euro, broad US dollar weakness, and looser exchange-rate links to the dollar in parts of Asia. Confidence in the euro area’s institutions, deeper financial integration, and the euro’s sharp appreciation likely increased its appeal as an alternative major reserve currency. Meanwhile, large US external and fiscal imbalances, the dot-com downturn, and low US interest rates may have reduced the relative attractiveness of dollar-denominated assets. China’s 2005 exchange-rate reform may also have supported gradual diversification towards the euro and regional currencies.
Figure 5 EUR-USD rose sharply during the 2000s
In the final years of the decade, the GFC introduced a countervailing force. Disruptions to global US dollar funding markets demonstrated that non-dollar reserves could become costly or difficult to convert into dollars during periods of stress. This may have marked the beginning of a shift towards larger and more readily usable dollar buffers, a trend that continued into the 2010s, particularly among reserve managers with foreign exchange reserves that were limited relative to their potential foreign-currency liquidity needs under stress.
Throughout the 2010s, episodes of US dollar funding stress reinforced the rationale for central banks to hold readily available dollar reserves rather than rely solely on financial markets for dollar liquidity during periods of stress. At the same time, US dollar strength, supported by the relative resilience of the US economy and monetary policy divergence, may have encouraged reserve allocations to the dollar. The euro area sovereign debt crisis may have further strengthened the dollar’s appeal by raising concerns about sovereign default, redenomination risk, and market liquidity in the euro-area and prompting safe-haven flows into the US.
The internationalisation of the Chinese renminbi, which gained momentum in 2010, created a new avenue for reserve diversification and culminated in its inclusion in the IMF’s SDR basket in 2016, although capital controls limited its role as a reserve currency. Toward the end of the decade, geopolitical considerations may also have begun to influence reserve allocations. Sanctions and asset freezes highlighted the risk for some countries of losing access to US dollar assets and payment systems, which may have encouraged them to diversify their reserve holdings.
Geopolitical considerations may have become even more important in the 2020s. The freezing of Russian central bank assets in 2022 demonstrated that reserves held in sanctioning jurisdictions could become inaccessible. Nevertheless, the evidence does not indicate a broad shift away from G4 currencies in central bank reserves. Exchange rate developments may have played a smaller role in the 2020s than in earlier decades, as most major currencies have remained relatively range-bound.
Going forward, the database will be updated continuously, allowing researchers and central banks to monitor developments in reserve currency allocations on an ongoing basis. While the analysis in the working paper covers the period from 1999 to 2025, the database also includes 2026 data for countries that have already reported them. So far, 21 countries have reported data for 2026. Although the sample remains small, these data point to a slight decline in the average share of US dollar holdings and a slight increase in the average share of euro holdings. Whether this marks the beginning of a new trend remains to be seen.
Source : VOXeu
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