Geopolitical tensions are changing the nature of supply-chain risk. This column presents new survey evidence showing that EU firms increasingly regard trade disruptions as persistent but are moving away from emergency responses such as stockpiling towards longer-term diversification of suppliers and markets. The EU Single Market provides an important buffer against external shocks. At the same time, experimental evidence shows that geopolitical disruptions can have sizeable and asymmetric effects on firms’ investment.
Over the past few years, European firms have faced an extraordinary succession of shocks. The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted trade and production networks, shortages of critical inputs constrained manufacturing, and transport bottlenecks increased costs. More recently, war, geopolitical tensions and trade restrictions have shifted attention from temporary disruptions towards the risk of more persistent fragmentation of the global economy.
Earlier evidence suggested that European firms responded pragmatically. Rather than withdrawing from global production networks, they accumulated inventories, invested in digital tracking of inputs and diversified suppliers. The EU Single Market also provided a buffer against external shocks (Arjona and Revoltella, 2024).
New evidence from the EIB Investment Survey (EIBIS) and the EIB-European Commission Survey on Supply Chain Tensions (SUCH) suggests that this adjustment has entered a new phase (EIB and DG GROW, 2026). The changing nature of supply chain risks is incentivising firms to move beyond emergency responses and incorporate resilience more permanently into their strategies. The emerging pattern is not one of deglobalisation. Rather, European firms increasingly appear to be pursuing resilience through diversification.
The shocks facing firms today look different from those of only a few years ago. Traditional supply-chain driven obstacles, including access to raw materials, semiconductors, and other components, as well as logistics disruptions, have somewhat eased, even though the crisis in the Middle East has caused significant disruption in oil supply. At the same time, compliance with new regulations and changes in customs and tariffs have become relatively more important obstacles.
Between 2023 and 2025, for example, the share of firms reporting major obstacles related to changes in customs and tariffs increased from 12% to 18%. While the EU faces important supply risks related to access to raw materials, the number of firms reporting them as major obstacles fell from 27% to 8% over the same period.
Figure 1 Major trade-related obstacles reported (% of firms)
While firms report that some trade-related obstacles have recently become less pressing, they do increasingly perceive supply chain risks and pressures as persistent rather than transitory. This is particularly evident among firms trading outside the European Union. Among firms trading with the United States, 67% expect tariffs to remain a permanent obstacle, while the corresponding share for firms trading with China is 60%.
This matters because firms respond differently to transitory bottlenecks than to tenacious changes in the trading environment. Inventories can help a company weather a short-lived disruption. However, if firms believe geopolitical tensions, tariffs and restrictions on access to inputs will persist, they have stronger incentives to reconsider where they source from, where they sell to, and how concentrated their supply chains should be.
Figure 2 Expected duration of trade disruptions (% of firms)
a) All EU firms
b) By trading partner
The central supply-chain challenge for European firms is thus increasingly shifting from managing temporary disruptions towards preparing for a trading environment in which geopolitical and policy uncertainty may be long-lasting.
Firm behaviour has evolved accordingly. In 2025, 64% of EU firms considered themselves fairly or very prepared for temporary or permanent geopolitical risks. Preparedness is higher among large firms, at 73%. At the same time, the share of EU firms stockpiling in response to trade disruptions has fallen sharply, from 31% two years earlier to 17%. By contrast, 11% of firms are shifting towards EU suppliers and 19% are diversifying their trading partners.
These developments suggest that a decline in emergency adjustments should not be interpreted simply as a lessening concern about supply chains. Instead, EU firms appear to be moving away from short-term shock absorption and towards more structural forms of risk management.
This also distinguishes the recent European response from developments in the United States. The report finds that many US firms increased stocks and inventories in 2025 in anticipation of tariff increases and reduced imports. EU firms, by contrast, have increasingly relied on longer-term measures such as shifting sourcing from non-EU to EU suppliers and diversifying their trading partners.
The pattern is therefore less one of retrenching from globalisation and more an attempt to preserve the efficiency benefits of international trade while reducing excessive dependencies on specific suppliers or markets.
One of the most important findings concerns the role of the EU Single Market.
Firms operating exclusively within the EU reduced their supply-chain adjustment activity more markedly between 2024 and 2025 than firms exposed to international trade. Importers and exporters dealing with markets outside the EU continued to invest more heavily in strengthening supply-chain resilience, reflecting their greater exposure to supply-chain risks.
Figure 3 Change in supply chain adjustments by EU firms from 2024 to 2025, by trading partner (percentage point change in the share of firms)
These results suggest that the Single Market plays an important stabilising role. Firms operating within a large integrated economic area have access to a wider range of customers and suppliers without being exposed to the same degree of geopolitical and trade-policy risk as firms trading outside the EU.
This points to a broader interpretation of the relationship between European integration and economic security. A deeper and more integrated Single Market can enhance resilience by expanding firms’ opportunities to diversify supply and demand. Together with new trade partnerships, accelerating integration can in the same way unleash untapped potential in terms of scale and investment in Europe (Revoltella, Arjona, Maurin and Vandermeeren, 2026).
Evidence on actual trade flows reinforces this conclusion.
Since 2021, EU imports have gradually shifted away from countries without EU trade agreements and towards EU suppliers, and trading partners with agreements. The report estimates that between 2021 and 2025 the share of imports coming from countries without agreements declined by about 2.2 percentage points. EU suppliers gained around 1.2 percentage points and non-neighbouring agreement partners around 1 percentage point.
This extends earlier evidence on the reallocation of EU trade following recent global shocks. Importantly, the emerging pattern does not appear to amount simply to increased reshoring and nearshoring. Geographically distant agreement partners have gained alongside intra-EU suppliers, consistent with emerging evidence of a broader shift towards partner-shoring (Arjona, Connell Garcia and Herghelegiu, 2025).
The distinction is important for the policy debate. De-risking is frequently associated with reshoring production or sourcing from geographically close economies. The evidence instead suggests a more nuanced adjustment involving both greater European sourcing as well as partner-shoring, alongside broader diversification.
Diversification, however, is not free. Moving towards alternative suppliers can involve higher costs, at least during an adjustment period. Nor is diversification feasible for every product. Where global production is itself heavily concentrated, firms may have few alternative suppliers capable of providing the required quantity or quality or may even face single points of failure (SPOF) or chokepoints in global trade networks.
The appropriate objective is therefore not complete self-sufficiency. It is to reduce excessive dependencies while retaining the substantial efficiency and innovation benefits associated with international trade.
Supply-chain restructuring is only one consequence of geopolitical uncertainty. An experimental module of EIBIS provides evidence that geopolitical risk can also affect firms’ willingness to invest.
Around 710 firms were randomly presented with hypothetical changes in US tariffs and geopolitical disruptions affecting access to inputs. Firms faced with scenarios involving greater geopolitical disruption reported substantially more negative investment responses than firms considering tariff increases alone. More adverse geopolitical conditions were associated with net investment responses of around -6% to -8%, compared with roughly -2% to -3% for tariff increases.
Figure 4 Investment responses to much higher US tariffs and much greater geopolitical disruption to input supply, by firm category (in net balance, %)
The asymmetry of firms’ responses is particularly relevant. Removing an adverse geopolitical scenario does not appear to result in a corresponding increase in firms’ investment intentions. The implication is that geopolitical uncertainty may depress investment beyond the immediate period in which disruption occurs.
This widens the economic significance of resilient supply chains. Geopolitical risks affect not only where firms source their inputs, but also potentially whether and how much they invest.
Taken together, the findings point to a policy challenge that is more subtle than choosing between globalisation and self-sufficiency.
The Single Market is one part of the solution. By expanding the range of suppliers and customers accessible within an integrated economic area, it can give European firms additional opportunities to diversify exposure to shocks. The behaviour of firms operating solely within the EU compared with firms exposed to markets outside the EU is consistent with such a stabilising role. A key element in achieving this lies in Europe’s ambitions to reindustrialise a number of strongholds in the form of strategic capacities within the Single Market, going from critical raw materials to net-zero technologies.
But a resilient Europe cannot rely only on itself. Trade agreements and economic partnerships can broaden the range of suppliers and markets available to European companies, reducing concentration without sacrificing the gains from international specialisation. Resilience also depends on the capacity of firms themselves to adapt, including through investment, innovation, and digitalisation.
The experience of recent years suggests that EU firms are already moving in this direction. They are not abandoning international supply chains. Instead, they are redesigning them to operate in an environment in which geopolitical risk is increasingly perceived as a lasting feature of the global economy.
Source : VOXeu
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