Climate

Gradually, then suddenly – the fiscal value of climate resilience

The human and economic costs of extreme weather events are already large and will grow as temperatures rise further. This column argues that, seen through the lens of the sovereign balance sheet rather than the budget, adaptation reduces the expected fiscal cost of physical climate risk – and the case for investing in it becomes clear.

The summer of 2026 gave Europe two warnings: it was the hottest on record, and its government bonds sold off. The timing was a coincidence, but with every flood or heatwave that the state has to pay for, climate risk turns into sovereign risk and surfaces – gradually, then perhaps suddenly – on the government balance sheet. In this column, I argue that adaptation can square the circle: it reduces the expected losses that physical climate risk imposes on the sovereign balance sheet, and with them both climate and sovereign risk.

Even as climate change continues mostly unabated, Europe is adapting only slowly (EEA 2024). One reason is that the fiscal return to adaptation is rarely calculated explicitly. Another is that fiscal space is tight, so investing in climate resilience competes with expenditure needs that either appear more existential (defence) or have more vocal support. Recognising the fiscal value of climate resilience would help.1  

Physical climate risk weighs on both sides of the sovereign balance sheet

The human and economic costs of extreme weather events – such as heatwaves, floods, storms and wildfires – are already large and will grow as temperatures rise further.2 Adaptation is investment in avoiding future damage. Because its value lies in a counterfactual, the economic, social and fiscal benefits of adaptation are hard to see: finance ministers, bond investors and voters notice the flood that did happen, rather than how much worse it might have been without the dyke. But the value of this counterfactual is real and can be estimated, even if with wide confidence bands. 

Natural disasters cause direct damage as well as an indirect macroeconomic cost in terms of lost output. The share of direct damage borne by the government is the direct fiscal cost of physical climate risk; lost output adds to it.3 When these events happen, the resulting cost falls on both sides of the sovereign balance sheet and lowers government net worth (total assets less total liabilities). Disasters destroy public assets – roads, bridges, schools – that have to be rebuilt. Governments also step in with relief for, and bailouts of, uninsured households, firms or banks. Physical climate risk thus creates an implicit contingent liability on the sovereign balance sheet, which materialises only once a disaster occurs.4

Adaptation makes fiscal sense

Fiscal rules treat adaptation the way Oscar Wilde’s cynic treats everything: they know its price, but not its value. Through the cash-flow lens of budgets and fiscal rules, adaptation is an outlay: it adds to spending – and, depending on how that spending is financed, to debt – today. However, through the balance-sheet lens, it swaps cash for a public asset – a dyke, say – so the government’s net worth does not change at first. Over time, by reducing exposure and vulnerability to climate hazards, adaptation lowers expected losses on both sides of the sovereign balance sheet: damage to public assets as well as what the state has to pay when disasters do occur. The size of this reduction is the fiscal value of climate resilience. Where this value exceeds its cost, adaptation raises the government’s expected net worth.5

A simple calculation (Figure 1) shows that flood defences are likely to strengthen the sovereign balance sheet: indicatively, each euro spent on adaptation could avoid more than €4 of flood damage to society over the rest of the century, saving the government about €3. These estimates leave out other extreme weather events, indirect macroeconomic costs and tail risks, all of which would raise the (fiscal) pay-off.6 Nonetheless, they suggest that treating adaptation simply as expenditure will lead governments to invest too little. Recognising what adaptation adds to expected government net worth could change that.

Figure 1 the fiscal and societal returns to each euro spent on flood adaptation7

Notes: All values are per euro spent on flood defences in the euro area, so the cost is €1 by construction. Present value over 2020-2100 of the direct damage avoided. Assumes a 64% government share.
Sources: Dottori et al. (2022); Vousdoukas et al. (2020); World Bank and European Commission (2021); own calculations.

Let climate resilience count for sovereign risk

Flood risk matters for euro area sovereign balance sheets: estimates based on JRC data suggest that river and coastal floods alone could impose an expected cost of about 2% of GDP (€320 billion at today’s GDP) cumulatively over the next 25 years, without considering tail risks, flash floods, and indirect macroeconomic effects.8 Retention areas, stronger dykes and higher sea walls would cost about €4 billion a year – roughly a third of what these floods are expected to cost governments each year over this period. By 2100, they would reduce flood damage by 80-90%. Adaptation would thus benefit society, the economy and the sovereign balance sheet. 

But the tools used in fiscal decision-making largely ignore these benefits.9 Debt sustainability assessments, fiscal-risk statements and sovereign stress tests could quantify expected losses from physical climate risk and assess how credible adaptation measures might reduce them. The benefits of adaptation would then show up in debt projections, rather than as an exemption from fiscal rules.

Beyond lowering expected costs, adaptation limits the (fiscal) cost of tail events – the low-probability, high-cost disasters that are particularly relevant from a sovereign-risk perspective (Preinfalk et al. 2026). Existing evidence suggests that climate shocks raise borrowing costs more in high-debt countries (Anyfantaki et al. 2025). Adaptation may thus matter most for those countries with least room to absorb additional shocks, and the least fiscal space to finance adaptation themselves.

Estimating what physical climate risk is expected to cost the sovereign balance sheet – and hence what adaptation would save – turns adaptation into a visibly worthwhile investment. The Ahr floods of 2021 caused direct damage worth about 0.8% of Germany’s GDP, floods in 2023 more than 11% of Slovenia’s, and the Valencia floods of 2024 about 1.1% of Spain’s (Grabbe et al., 2026). One such event in a highly indebted country, or several in quick succession in a smaller one, could be how “gradual” becomes “sudden”. Governments that recognise the fiscal value of climate resilience – and invest in adaptation – can keep “sudden” small while protecting livelihoods.

Source : VOXeu

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