Women in Latin America have higher educational attainment than men, and gender inequality in maths and reading scores has fallen over time. Yet, gender gaps in labour force participation persist. This column examines gender inequality in Latin America, and finds that employed women are over-represented in smaller firms and the informal sector. Women still spend at least double the number of hours as men on care activities and household chores, and women experience a substantial decline in labour force participation and earnings following parenthood. The gender gap is particularly large for women without a tertiary education.
There is growing pessimism about the global rate of progress towards gender equality. Recent estimates suggest that if progress continues at the rate observed since 2006, it will take 131 years to reach full parity based on a multidimensional index of gender equality (World Economic Forum 2023). Research by Badel et al. (2024) using Markov chains to study the distribution of long-run gender gaps in labour force participation warns that substantial gaps will persist across many countries if they rely primarily on economic development to close these gaps.
In line with these calls for a renewed focus on the challenge of gender inequality, in a recent publication (Berniell et al. 2024), we examine the state of gender inequality in Latin America, focusing on two critical spheres in which gender inequality is generated: education and work. We provide a current snapshot as well as a dynamic perspective that highlights successes and failures, reflect on differences in the ways that gender inequalities play out across different socioeconomic groups and countries in the region at different levels of per capita GDP, and draw comparisons with countries outside the region. 1 What emerges is a complex picture with some areas of real progress while others of a striking lack, alongside important heterogeneity across and within countries.
Education
As in the OECD, Latin American women have higher levels of education than their male counterparts in the vast majority of countries in the region. While, for the most part, gender differences in secondary education are not a recent phenomenon and have been stable over the last 20 years, there is clear evidence of a widening gap in higher education. Judging by the experience of the OECD and that of the higher-income countries in the region, these gaps will continue to widen (see Figure 1).
Figure 1 Evolution of higher education completion rates
Notes: The figure shows the evolution of higher-education completion rates. The sample is restricted to individuals aged 30–40 years (except for the OECD, where it is restricted to individuals aged 35–44 years). In Panel (a), each represents the (unweighted) cross-country average of the 5-year average. In Panel (b), each dot represents the (unweighted) annual average among the OECD countries.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on household surveys (GenLAC) and OECD STATS. The year used in the calculations is 2021 in the OECD and 2019 or the latest available up to 2019 in Latin America (see Berniell et al. 2024, Table B.1 in Appendix B.2). In Latin America, all countries with available data in the corresponding periods are included (unbalanced panel in the case of lower-middle-income countries).
In contrast to gender differences in the levels of educational attainment, those in achievement have shrunk over time. 2 As shown in our paper, in third grade, girls perform better than boys in both reading and math in almost all Latin American countries, but by sixth grade, boys on average score better than girls in math while girls perform better than boys in reading. 3 At age 15, the OECD Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) evidence for 2018 shows that the gap in favour of girls in reading is substantial (though not as large as in the OECD), whereas the gap in maths favouring boys is smaller, particularly in the higher-income countries. 4
The PISA data from the 2012 exams allow us to explore whether there was a confidence gap as well as a test gap in maths. We construct a confidence index using answers to a series of statements – such as ‘I am good at mathematics’ and ‘In my math class, I understand even the most difficult work’ – in which individuals choose their degree of agreement with the statements. Boys on average were clearly more confident in their math skills and aptitudes than girls. While this may be thought to reflect an underlying reality, we show that this is not the case. Indeed, comparing boys and girls with the same math score, boys exhibited a higher degree of confidence both in Latin America and in the OECD (Figures 2a and 2b), a result also found in recent experimental evidence for the US (Exley and Kessler 2022).
Figure 2 Maths self-perception by percentile of PISA mathematics score distribution
Notes: The figure graphs the average math self-perception index (as defined in the text) against each percentile of the PISA score distribution (x-axis). The relationship is shown separately for boys (blue) and girls (orange) by country in Latin America (Figure a), and by country in the OECD (Figure b). The blue and orange lines depict the Lowess regression curves illustrating the relationships between the self-perception index and the PISA score percentile for boys and girls, respectively.
Gender gaps in math performance and confidence may also help account for disparities in the pursuit of STEM degrees and employment in STEM occupations observed across the region. In those Latin American countries with available data, at age 15 girls are less than half as likely as boys to expect to work in STEM areas; this closely mirrors the proportions of 30–40 year-old women working in STEM occupations. These disparities are significant because labour market returns in STEM fields far exceed those in sectors where women are over-represented, such as health or education.
Labour force participation
Alongside advancements in the educational attainment of women, there has been a substantial increase in female labour force participation over the past decades (e.g. Chile and Costa Rica), but in several countries, this progress has stalled at low levels (e.g. Colombia) or even regressed (e.g. Honduras and the Dominican Republic). The lifecycle graphs across different cohorts below illustrate this heterogeneity.
Figure 3 Female labour force participation over the life cycle across cohorts
Source: Berniell et al. (2024).
There is also significant heterogeneity within countries: across all Latin American countries, there is a pronounced education gradient in female labour force participation, with much higher labour force participation among women with higher education levels, mirrored by a similarly steep education gradient in labour force participation gender gaps (Figure 4). Whereas the gender gap among those with a college education is similar to that in the US, the gap for those with secondary education or less than completed secondary is substantially larger, indicating that women in these categories should be the main focus of policies to increase women’s labour force participation in the region.
Figure 4 Gender gaps in labour force participation (F-M) by education
Notes: This figure shows, by education level, the gender gap (F-M) in the share of the population aged 25–55 years that is economically active, as defined in the text. Low refers to less than complete high school; medium denotes high school graduates without higher education; and high indicates completed tertiary education. The average bars show unweighted means.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on Latin America household surveys (GenLAC) and the American Community Survey. Survey year is 2019 or the latest year available up to 2019.
In addition to their lower participation in the labour market, employed women are over-represented in smaller firms and in the informal sector. Jobs in the informal sector typically come with less employment protection, diminished formal rights, and limited entitlements to in-work benefits. These gender gaps vary significantly by education. Women with a tertiary education are less likely than their male counterparts to be in the informal sector, whereas women with less education are significantly more likely to be employed in the informal sector (Figure 5). Women also lag behind men in wages, with little change over the last 20 years and, as we show in the paper, when we adjust wages for characteristics such as age, education, part-time versus full-time work, sector, and occupation, the wage gap actually widens, unlike in the US.
Figure 5 Gender gap in informality by education (F-M)
Notes: Individuals aged 25–55 years old. The figures show, by education level, the gender gap (F-M) in the share of employment that is in the informal sector, as defined in the text. Low refers to less than high school education; medium denotes high school graduates without higher education; and high indicates completed tertiary education. The average bars show unweighted means. The survey year is 2019 or the latest year available up to 2019.
Source: Berniell et al. (2024).
Culture
Gender attitudes towards women’s work have been shown to be important determinants of women’s labour supply (Fernández and Fogli 2009, Fernández et al. 2021). Not surprisingly, there is a negative correlation between attitudes towards women’s work and the gender gap in labour force participation (Figure 6a), though it is encouraging to note that these attitudes have become more gender equal over time (from 2008 to 2015) as shown below (Figure 6b).
Figure 6 “A woman should work only if husband doesn’t earn enough” (% disagreeing)
Note: Individuals aged 25–55 years old. Figure 6a shows, for 2015, the correlation between the degree of disagreement (‘disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’) with the statement ‘A woman should work only if her husband doesn’t earn enough’ and the gender gap in labour force participation (M-F). Figure 6b shows the percentage of individuals who disagree or strongly disagree with that statement in 2008 – the x-axis – and 2015 – the y-axis (as opposed to agreeing or strongly agreeing). The different colours refer to the different country groups: higher-income, upper-middle-income, and lower-middle-income. Source: authors’ own calculations based on Latinobarometro, 2008 and 2015.
The importance of cultural beliefs regarding gender roles shows up clearly in the time spent in care activities and household chores. Figure 7 shows female-to-male ratios of hours worked in the market, in care and household chores (‘non-market hours’), and in total, all for couples aged 25–45 years old. 6 In Latin America this ratio is always above two for the non-market hours; in some countries, women put in five times the number of non-market hours as men. In all countries, women do more total hours of work. This can be compared with the US (included in the left-most figure), where women also put in more non-market hours but the ratio is slightly lower than in Latin America, leading to lower total hours for women than for men.
Figure 7 Market and non-market weekly working hours (ratio F/M)
Notes: Individuals in couples aged 25–45 years old. Non-market hours include care activities and household chores. The value of the variable is set equal to zero when the individual does not participate in an activity.
Source: Berniell et al. (2024).
There are also strong negative associations between having children and labour market outcomes for women; such associations are absent for men. Across the Latin American region, the labour force participation among women with children is significantly lower than that of those who do not have children. Following an approach aligned with several recent studies on the influence of children on the gender wage gap (e.g. Kleven et al. 2024), we employ a pseudo-panel event-study methodology to quantify the gaps that emerge between men and women after the birth of the first child and how these gaps evolve over the subsequent years. We show that in Latin American countries, women experience a substantial decline in labour force participation and earnings following parenthood – by more than 20% and 40%, respectively. While there are variations among countries, the results exhibit similarities across income groups (Figures 8 and 9).
Figure 8 Parenthood and labour force participation
Notes: The figures present the cross-country unweighted means of the estimated impact of children on labour force participation for both men and women. As the omitted category is τ = 1, the coefficients show the impact of children as a percentage of the counterfactual relative to the year preceding the birth of the first child. Controls include calendar year and age fixed effects. Sample restriction: age for first birth is 25 to 45. The figure displays the 90% confidence intervals.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on household surveys (GenLAC). Years 2003–2019. See Berniell et al. (2004) for more detail.
Figure 9 Parenthood and earnings
Notes: The figures present the cross-country unweighted means of the estimated impact of children on labour earnings for both men and women. As the omitted category is τ = 1, the coefficients show the impact of children as a percentage of the counterfactual relative to the year preceding the birth of the first child. Controls include calendar year and age fixed effects. Sample restriction: age for first birth is 25 to 45. The figure displays the 90% confidence intervals.
Source: Authors’ own calculations based on household surveys (GenLAC). Years 2E003–2019.
Conclusion
To sum up, the picture that emerges from our analysis is mixed. On the one hand, there are important dimensions in which women in Latin America are at an advantage relative to men, such as educational attainment, and there are areas in which inequality has fallen over time, such as gender gaps in math and reading scores. Gender inequality persists, however, in several key indicators especially in the spheres of paid and unpaid work. Furthermore, in several of these domains, such as participation in the formal sector relative to the informal one, large gender gaps persist for individuals without a tertiary education. Finally, there are critical indicators, such as the gender wage gap, in which remarkably little progress has been made over the last 20 years.
Echoing wider calls for stronger action, the material presented in our work is intended to inspire and inform policy actions and spur further research in the critical areas that we have examined, as well as in other dimensions of gender inequality such as gender violence, healthcare, poverty, and political representation.
Source : VOXeu