The US dollar has dominated the international monetary system since the end of Bretton Woods. This column examines the role of the US dollar in denominating international debt securities. Over recent decades, it identifies a wavelike pattern in the dollar’s market share, with three distinct waves of dollarisation since the 1960s. The most recent wave, which emerged after the 2008 global crisis, pushed the dollar’s share to nearly match its level from 2000, when the euro was introduced. Closer alignment of a country’s domestic currency with a reserve currency is associated with higher shares of debt issuance in that reserve currency.
The dominant role of the US dollar in the international monetary system following the end of Bretton Woods has been a central focus for both policymakers and economists. The launch of the euro in 1999 and China’s push to globalise the renminbi from 2010 onward were initially considered potential rivals to dollar hegemony. Yet these competitive pressures have since waned. The prevailing perspective today is that the dollar’s preeminent status remains secure due to the absence of viable alternatives.
In a recent paper (Pradhan et al. 2026), we present fresh insights into the dollar’s position in international finance by analysing international debt securities (IDS) data collected by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). The BIS defines international debt securities as bonds that are listed in, registered in, or governed by the legal frameworks of financial markets outside the issuer’s home country. The volume of outstanding international debt securities has expanded dramatically from $2 billion in 1970 to $30 trillion by the end of 2024 — exceeding cross-border bank loans in BIS reporting countries by approximately $6 trillion. This substantial scale underscores the critical role international debt securities play in the global financial system. The choice of currency denomination for international debt securities serves as a valuable indicator of how different currencies rank in terms of prominence within international financial markets.
We find that, since 2000, the dollar’s dominance has fluctuated in a wavelike pattern rather than following a consistent upward or downward trajectory (Figure 1). The dollar’s proportion of outstanding IDS stocks (red line) declined from approximately 60% in the early 2000s to roughly 43% in 2008, then rebounded sharply to around 60% during the late 2010s. Notably, the dollar’s share in 2024 stands at nearly the same level it held in 2000. Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose!
Figure 1 Outstanding stocks of international debt securities (IDS) by currency of denomination, 2000–24
(Shares in per cent of total in all currencies)
Following its launch in 2000, the euro’s share experienced a dramatic rise, marking a notable ‘euro moment’. The euro’s proportion of outstanding stocks (blue line) grew twofold from approximately 15% in 2000 to about 30% by 2008. While the euro’s share retreated following the Global Crisis, it still remained substantially above its 2000 inaugural level by 2024. Consequently, claims regarding the euro’s demise appear to exaggerate a relatively brief downward trend.
Our analysis not only offers fresh perspectives but also validates the key conclusions from the landmark study by Maggiori et al. (2020). Drawing on institutional investor portfolio data, Maggiori et al. (2020) document that the dollar’s proportion of global cross-border corporate debt holdings (represented by the dotted red line in Figure 1) held steady between 2005 and 2008 before rising substantially through 2017. Based on this dollarisation phase, the authors assert: “The US dollar appears today to be the world’s only international currency. As recently as 10 years ago, however, this was not the case.” Our results corroborate their observations for the timeframe they examined (2005–17, indicated by vertical dotted lines in Figure 1). Yet our extended dataset offers a broader perspective: the dollarisation ‘trend’ appears confined to the 2008-17 window and does not represent a more enduring pattern when viewed over a longer horizon.
Examining data from the pre-Bretton Woods era (1966 onwards) uncovers two more dollarisation waves (Figure 2). The dollar’s proportion increased on two occasions — first during the early 1980s and subsequently in the late 1990s — before retreating each time. The dollar’s share at the crest of the present wave essentially matches its peaks in both 1984 and 2000. Remarkably, after half a century and three distinct dollar waves, the dollar’s share remains comparable to its level in 1973, when the Bretton Woods system ended.
The historical examination also reveals an important correlation: dollar waves closely track the dollar’s exchange rate fluctuations (see black and blue lines in Figure 2). The dollar’s share rises during periods of dollar appreciation and falls during depreciation. Consequently, exchange rate movements account for part of the observed wave pattern. When the analysis adjusts for exchange rate effects, the wavelike pattern persists but becomes less pronounced.
Figure 2 A historical perspective on outstanding stocks of dollar-denominated international debt securities, 1966–2024
(In per cent of total in all currencies)
The international debt securities dataset enables us to analyse currency denomination patterns in both new issuances and outstanding stocks (Figure 3). Notably, new issuances of euro-denominated international debt securities (blue line) nearly matched those of dollar-denominated securities (red line) in the years immediately before the Global Crisis.
Figure 3 Gross issuance of international debt securities by currency
(Four-quarter moving average, in per cent of total in all currencies)
Next, we provide a brief overview of how other major currencies have evolved in international debt securities issuance, as illustrated by the black line in Figure 1. The evidence indicates that China’s internationalisation campaign did not significantly impact the renminbi’s usage in international debt securities issuance. Nevertheless, the renminbi experienced growth from virtually zero starting in 2000. Although the renminbi’s share of outstanding international debt securities remained relatively small by 2024, it had surpassed the Swiss franc and approached parity with the Japanese yen. Throughout the past 25 years, both the Japanese yen and Swiss franc have represented considerably smaller portions of international debt securities issuance compared to earlier periods. In 2024, the British pound sterling maintained a share similar to what it held in 2000.
We investigate which factors drive the currency denomination of international debt securities. We focus on the role of ‘currency zone alignment’ – measuring how closely a country’s currency moves together with a major reserve currency like the dollar or the euro. In addition, we study the role of economic conditions and geopolitical tensions.
We find that currency zone alignment plays a critical role: countries whose currencies move more closely with the dollar tend to issue significantly more dollar-denominated debt, and the same pattern holds for the euro. This makes economic sense — if a country’s home currency stays stable relative to the dollar, borrowing in dollars carries less exchange rate risk. We also show that higher domestic interest rates encourage dollar borrowing (as domestic currency funding becomes more expensive), while higher US Treasury rates discourage it (as dollar funding becomes more expensive). Geopolitical tensions affect public sector borrowers more than private companies, and US-based issuers tend to diversify away from the dollar when domestic risks rise.
The dollar’s dominance has fluctuated in wavelike patterns rather than following a consistent upward or downward trend, contradicting both claims of increasing dollar hegemony and narratives of de-dollarisation. During the ‘euro moment’ preceding the Global Crisis, the euro’s proportion of new issuances nearly rivalled that of the dollar. Turning to drivers, the degree to which a country’s currency moves in tandem with a major reserve currency strongly predicts how much debt that country issues in that reserve currency.
Source : VOXeu
The weak performance of business investment across the OECD since the Global Financial Crisis holds…
Solid waste is one of the most visible by-products of human prosperity—and one of the…
Climate mitigation investment increases with long horizons, economic scale and investor diversity, underscoring long-term capital…
China is relatively inured to the Iran conflict, but less external demand could hit its…
The composition of international reserves is in a constant state of flux. This column identifies…
There are concerns that the widespread adoption of central bank digital currencies could drain bank…