The US has replaced Russia to a great extent as an energy supplier to the European Union, but this has not so far created a new vulnerability.
Since 2022, the European Union has sharply increased energy imports from the United States. The US now accounts for about one-fifth on average of EU imports of natural gas – particularly liquefied natural gas – crude oil, coal and uranium. These imports amounted to €70 billion in 2024.
Does this mean the EU has replaced dependence on Russian fossil fuels with a new reliance on a single external supplier? The US national security strategy emphasises the objective of “restoring American energy dominance (in oil, gas, coal, and nuclear)” (The White House, 2025). US energy exports are framed not only as commercial flows, but as tools of economic strength and geopolitical influence, intended to deepen ties with allies and constrain adversaries. As the world’s largest oil and gas producer (Energy Institute, 2025), and the leading LNG exporter, the US now carries greater weight for the EU’s energy security.
However, this does not give Washington the kind of leverage Russia once held over Europe. First, the EU’s relative reliance on US supply is smaller than its reliance on Russia in 2021 (Figure 1). Second, it would be far harder for the US to restrict energy exports to the EU for political reasons. The US administration does not in principle determine where private energy companies sell their products. This contrasts with the Russian state, which directly controls exports. Third, EU energy imports from the US are seaborne, offering an extra layer of resilience compared to historic Russian pipeline imports. LNG suppliers can be switched relatively easily, whereas accessing a new supplier of pipeline gas typically requires new infrastructure.
However, the EU’s overall reliance on imported energy continues to entail vulnerabilities. Supply security depends on global markets and political developments beyond Europe’s control. Disruptions in major producing regions, shipping routes or energy infrastructure – illustrated by the March 2026 closure of the Strait of Hormuz and damage to energy facilities (Prétat et al, 2026) – can quickly tighten markets and push up prices.
In this analysis, we explore the EU’s dependence on the US for natural gas, crude oil, coal and uranium. We conclude by discussing the two main options for improving EU resilience of supply: reducing fossil fuel demand and boosting storage.
Natural gas and LNG
The EU’s shift to US energy is most pronounced for natural gas. In 2021, Russia supplied two-fifths of the EU’s gas. Since then, US LNG has replaced Russian pipeline gas and, increasingly, some supplies from Africa and the Middle East (Bruegel Dataset, 2022a). US LNG now accounts for one-quarter of the EU’s gas supply, making the US the EU’s second-largest supplier after Norway.
Russian gas was delivered to Europe predominantly through four pipelines. The stopping of these pipeline flows made it hard logistically to replace the supplies arriving in central and eastern Europe. The rapid build-out of LNG terminals has changed this. EU LNG import capacity is now 270 billion cubic metres (bcm; 80 percent of gas demand), which allows buyers to access a wider range of exporters and shift between suppliers more easily than under the previous pipeline system. Consequently, supply is now more diverse and reliance on any single exporter has fallen.
EU gas security now depends more on the global LNG market. If global gas demand rises or supplies are disrupted, the risk will show up in higher prices and stronger competition for cargoes, rather than in physical shortages. If the US reduced its exports of LNG to the EU, global flows would adjust. The impact would materialise through higher gas prices and trade reshuffling, but not a physical gas cut-off.
In any case, in practice, US exporters would struggle to redirect LNG cargoes away from the EU. The EU and the US account for the largest bilateral LNG trade flows (Figure 2). Chinese tariffs mean the US does not export LNG to China, limiting scope for diversion. In principle, some US cargoes could be rerouted to Asian buyers such as Japan or South Korea through swaps with suppliers such as Australia. However, rerouting US cargoes in this way would lengthen shipping routes, raise transport costs and require complex contractual arrangements. Without the European market, the US would likely have to reduce exports, which would spike global prices.
Meanwhile, EU gas demand is about one-fifth lower than before the 2022 crisis triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine (Bruegel Dataset, 2022b). Europe thus needs to buy less gas in tight markets, and its stored gas lasts longer during disruptions. Storage capacity is now equivalent to over 30 percent of EU annual gas consumption, compared to 25 percent in 2021.
Crude oil and products
Oil accounts for the largest share of EU spending on US energy (Figure 3). Domestic production is limited and the EU thus relies almost entirely on crude oil imports. Before 2022, Russia supplied roughly one-third of the EU’s crude oil. Now, the US and Norway each account for one-eighth of EU crude oil imports.
Crude oil is refined into diesel, gasoline and other products. The EU banned Russian crude in 2022 and refined products from Russia in 2023. Most oil products consumed in the EU are refined domestically from imported crude, though the EU remains a net importer of diesel and, to a lesser extent, jet fuel. The US is the EU’s largest external supplier of oil products, providing around one-eighth of total imports.
Oil markets are global, liquid and diversified, meaning the scope for US political pressure through the oil trade is limited. While the US accounts for roughly one-fifth of global oil production, it consumes a similar share. Consequently, although it is a large exporter, any export restriction would raise global prices and feed back into the US economy. European countries hold emergency stocks of crude oil and petroleum products equivalent to at least 90 days of net imports or 61 days of inland consumption, whichever is higher. These reserves provide a buffer against short-term supply disruptions.
Coal
Before the 2022 sanctions, about half of EU coal imports came from Russia. When Russian coal was banned, EU buyers replaced Russian coal with shipments from the US and Australia. The US now accounts for roughly one quarter of EU coal imports by value and about one third by volume. Coal is widely traded, shipped by sea and priced on global benchmarks. The US accounts for roughly 5 percent of global coal production (Energy Institute, 2025), limiting its ability to exert pressure. As with oil, trade flows can be reshuffled across regions in response to price signals.
Although coal is used for electricity generation and industrial processes such as steel manufacturing, its role in the EU energy mix is declining. The share of coal in EU electricity generation has fallen from about 25 percent to roughly 9 percent in the last decade, yet remains significant in Poland, Bulgaria, Czechia and Germany (Bruegel Dataset, 2025).
Nuclear fuel
In value terms, the US accounts for roughly 10 percent of EU uranium imports. Nuclear power generates about 23 percent of EU electricity. EU utilities also hold enough uranium on average for more than three refuelling cycles (totalling roughly four to six years), providing a buffer and reducing short-term supply risks.
In 2024, natural uranium delivered to EU utilities originated mainly from Canada (34 percent), Kazakhstan (24 percent) and Australia (11 percent). Conversion or uranium into gas for use in the EU is divided among providers in the EU, Russia, Canada and the US, with each accounting for roughly one-fifth of deliveries. For uranium enrichment, EU-based companies supply nearly two-thirds of services to EU utilities. European dependence on US supplies is thus not critical at any stage.
In fact, the US may be more reliant on the EU for uranium supplies than the other way around. The US relies on the EU for about 40 percent of its enrichment services (Figure 4). This supply will become more important because the US will phase out Russian uranium supplies by 2028.
Policy considerations
US energy dominance does not obviously translate into conventional leverage over the EU. The US cannot easily pressure Europe by threatening to cut energy supplies. However, the EU remains vulnerable to energy price shocks when markets tighten. The US can influence global energy markets and geopolitical dynamics, as seen with rising energy prices following the US/Israel attack on Iran in March 202610. These supply disruptions drive up global energy prices and feed directly into European markets.
The EU can limit this risk by reducing gas and oil demand and maintaining high storage levels, especially during periods of political or trade tension. Lower EU gas demand reduces exposure to price volatility and allows the EU to be more selective in its choice of suppliers (Łoskot-Strachota et al, 2024). Yet, progress in reducing fossil-fuel demand is insufficient, shown by the share of electricity in energy demand remaining at 23 percent since 2011 (Bruegel Dataset, 2025).
Policy should prioritise households, which, unlike the power sector, cannot easily switch fuels when prices rise. Governments should urgently develop plans for how to return revenues from the forthcoming inclusion of buildings and transport into European emissions trading. Revenues can support investment from vulnerable European consumers into green transport, heating and cooling.
A second EU policy lever is gas storage. Although it does not eliminate reliance on foreign suppliers, it reduces exposure to short-term supply disruption. The EU already requires minimum filling levels and relies largely on commercially-operated storage to balance seasonal demand. However, storage is market-based and not designed as a dedicated emergency reserve.
A better approach would be to establish a legally and operationally separate strategic gas reserve, similar to oil reserves. While commercial storage would continue to respond to market signals and manage seasonal balancing, the strategic reserve would become available under predefined trigger conditions in defined crisis scenarios. Designing such a framework would require explicit policy choices and careful trade-offs, including the scale and cost of the reserve, the degree of state control and its interaction with market price signals. Because a strategic reserve serves a collective security function, its costs should be shared at EU level, rather than borne solely by countries with storage capacity.
Source : Bruegel
