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The effects of inflation on euro area public debt

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Whether inflation can ease public debt burdens is an increasingly important question as debt sustainability concerns rise in the euro area. This column applies a new debt decomposition framework to assess how inflation affected debt ratios in the five largest euro area sovereign issuers over 2005–2025. It finds that inflation played a small role in reducing the public debt burden. The post-pandemic inflation surprise largely reflected imported costs, which do little to raise nominal output. Increases in longer-term inflation compensation lowered the market value of debt, but were not sufficient to offset the debt-increasing effect of earlier declines.

Public debt-to-GDP ratios are high worldwide, including in many euro area countries. With interest rates rising, debt sustainability is a pressing concern. This comes as inflation picks up again, with energy prices rising amid the war in the Middle East (Verduzco-Bustos and Zanetti 2026). This raises a natural question: can inflation help governments reduce the debt burden? Acalin and Ball (2023) find a material role for surprise inflation in bringing down debt after WWII. By contrast, Hilscher et al. (2014) saw little scope for the US to inflate away its public debt, given the maturity structure of US debt and the low likelihood of a prolonged inflation outburst.

In this column, we apply a new debt decomposition framework (Boeckx et al. 2026) to assess how inflation has affected debt/GDP dynamics in the euro area between 2005 and 2025. We find that inflation played only a marginal role in reducing the public debt burden. Although investors were surprised by the post-pandemic inflation surge, much of that increase reflected imported costs, which do little to raise the denominator of the debt ratio. At the same time, sharp upward revisions in longer-term inflation compensation embedded in bond prices reduced the market value of public debt. However, that reversal was not sufficient to undo the debt-increasing effects of the pre-pandemic years, when inflation and inflation compensation gradually declined.

Our new debt dynamics decomposition shows a small role for inflation

Hall and Sargent (2011) provide the go-to starting point for understanding debt dynamics, where debt is measured by its market value. They split the change in the debt/GDP ratio into contributions from debt issuance, returns paid on debt,1 economic growth, and GDP deflator inflation. Figure 1 applies their framework to the aggregate debt ratio of the five largest sovereign issuers in the euro area (Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Belgium) — the euro area Big 5. Issuance and returns paid to bondholders pushed up the debt ratio while nominal growth reduced it, leaving the debt ratio 16 percentage points higher in 2025 than in 2005.

Figure 1 Decomposition of the cumulative change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio based on Hall and Sargent (2011)

Figure 1 Decomposition of the cumulative change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio
Figure 1 Decomposition of the cumulative change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio
Notes: The figure shows the cumulative change in the debt/GDP ratio (dotted black line) and its decomposition into four main drivers (stacked bars) based on the Hall and Sargent (2011) approach. The y-axis is in percentage points. Sample: 2005Q2-2025Q2.

Taken at face value, the figure suggests that inflation reduced the debt ratio by 24 percentage points between 2005 and 2025. Yet realised GDP deflator inflation does not fully capture how inflation affects debt/GDP dynamics. It is therefore important to consider what investors expected inflation to be and what compensation they required for bearing the inflation risk inherent in nominal bonds. Using swap-market information on inflation compensation (inflation-linked swap rates) and the risk-free rate (overnight indexed swap rates, OIS) in the euro area, we separate the return on a nominal government bond into three components: the euro area real interest rate, the euro area inflation compensation, and the sovereign spread. We then further decompose each into short- and long-term components, and we distinguish expected compensation from subsequent surprises using a term structure model in the spirit of Bauer and Rudebusch (2020) and Boeckx et al. (2025).

Figure 2 shows that realised inflation was largely matched by the short-term inflation compensation required by investors. The blue bars capture this inflation-compensation gap, defined as the one-quarter inflation swap rate minus realised GDP-deflator inflation. With a total negative contribution of only three percentage points, this inflation channel hardly affected debt dynamics. By contrast, the persistently negative gap between the ex-ante real short-term risk-free interest rate and economic growth reduced the debt ratio by 24 percentage points (red bars). Governments, however, paid investors positive returns for bearing duration (grey bars) and sovereign risk (purple bars), so both factors increased the debt ratio.2 But there are two further aspects of inflation’s impact to consider: the role of imported inflation and the inflation compensation embedded in longer-term bonds.

Figure 2 Decomposition of the change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio based on our approach

Figure 2 Decomposition of the change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio based on our approach
Figure 2 Decomposition of the change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio based on our approach
Notes: The figure shows the cumulative change in the debt/GDP ratio (dotted black line) and its decomposition according to our proposed extension (stacked bars). The y-axis is in percentage points. The inflation compensation gap is the one-quarter inflation-linked swap rate minus GDP deflator inflation. r-g denotes the one-quarter ex-ante real overnight indexed swap (OIS) rate minus real GDP growth. OIS excess returns are the maturity-weighted returns attributable to OIS rates at maturities beyond the one-quarter horizon, and the country spread is the maturity-weighted return on sovereign debt minus the corresponding OIS return. Sample: 2005Q2-2025Q2.

The source of inflation (domestic versus imported) is key

The small role of inflation (blue bars in Figure 2) seems at odds with the fact that the 2022-2023 inflation surge surprised many economists (Chahad et al. 2022). The key mechanism is that investors require compensation for consumer price inflation, whereas GDP deflator inflation enters the denominator of the debt ratio. Figure 3 therefore splits the contribution of the inflation compensation gap into two components: a pure inflation surprise and a wedge between consumer price inflation and GDP deflator inflation. These two components broadly offset each other after the pandemic. Between late 2020 and early 2023, consumer price inflation in the euro area came in higher than priced by the short end of the inflation swap curve. All else equal, this surprise lowers the debt ratio. However, the GDP deflator rose much less than consumer prices because the inflation surge largely reflected imported inflation, which does little to reduce the debt/GDP ratio (see also Bénassy-Quéré 2026).

Figure 3 Contributions to the change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio from the consumer price inflation surprise and the consumer price – GDP deflator wedge

Figure 3 Contributions to the change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio from the consumer price inflation surprise and the consumer price – GDP deflator wedge
Figure 3 Contributions to the change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio from the consumer price inflation surprise and the consumer price – GDP deflator wedge
Notes: The chart decomposes the contribution of the inflation compensation gap from Figure 2 into (i) the pure consumer price inflation surprise, and (ii) GDP deflator inflation differing from consumer price inflation. The y-axis is in percentage points. Sample: 2005Q2-2025Q2.

Changes in longer-term inflation compensation also matter

The blue bars in Figure 2 only reflect the interplay between short-term inflation compensation and realised inflation. Because governments issue long-maturity bonds, changes in longer-term inflation compensation can also affect their returns and, hence, debt dynamics. Our decomposition allows us to isolate the part of unexpected returns associated with changes in longer-term inflation compensation. Figure 4 shows that this contribution was substantial.3

From 2013 until 2021, the component associated with declining longer-term inflation compensation increased the market value of debt by 16 percentage points of GDP. The subsequent rise in inflation compensation reversed much of this increase. However, it did not fully offset the debt-increasing contribution from the decline in inflation compensation during the preceding low-inflation period.

Figure 4 Contribution to the change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio associated with changes in longer-term inflation compensation

Figure 4 Contribution to the change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio associated with changes in longer-term inflation compensation
Figure 4 Contribution to the change in the euro area Big 5 debt/GDP ratio associated with changes in longer-term inflation compensation
Notes: The y-axis is in percentage points. Sample: 2005Q2-2025Q2.

Conclusion

From 2005 to 2025, inflation ultimately played only a small role in reducing public debt ratios in the euro area. Our results therefore offer little support for the idea that governments can rely on inflation to bring down high debt ratios. But this net result masks quite different forces at work, with substantial variation over time. Moreover, the results presented here are for the five largest euro area sovereign issuers in aggregate. The picture differs considerably across countries and changes when central bank bond holdings are considered. We explore these differences in detail in Boeckx et al. (2026).

Source : VOXeu

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