In public discourse on fiscal tensions across OECD countries, the potential contribution of higher economic growth tends to be overstated. This column argues that long-run fiscal sustainability cannot prudently rely on growth alone. OECD modelling shows that under current policy settings, productivity-led growth provides minimal fiscal relief due to wage linkages, benefit indexation, and relative price effects. Growth from rising labour utilisation is fiscally more potent, but restraining public expenditure is the surest path to long-run fiscal sustainability.
In the aftermath of recent global economic shocks, public debt ratios across the OECD have reached historically elevated levels. This is especially true in G7 countries, where government gross debt now exceeds 120% of GDP on average, whereas it was below 90% twenty years ago. This debt buildup has acquired renewed urgency as sovereign bond yields have risen over recent months in many countries, ending a long period of exceptionally low financing costs and placing immediate pressure on government budgets. This month the IMF issued an urgent call for advanced economies to cut deficits and lower debt levels, warning that delays would only make the job harder in coming years (IMF 2026).
Long-run fiscal gaps are sizeable
The structural fiscal pressures that governments must grapple with extend far into the future. In a recent paper, I document the scale of these challenges using the OECD Long-Term Model (Guillemette 2026). For 35 OECD members and accession-candidate countries, the model uses a common cross-country framework and a set of long-term economic projections to calculate a long-run fiscal gap. The gap is the fiscal adjustment needed to stabilise the public debt-to-GDP ratio near its current level over a given horizon, accounting for initial fiscal imbalances, demographic projections, interest rates, and structural spending trends. The framework explicitly incorporates defence spending as a persistent source of fiscal pressure alongside health, long-term care, and pensions.
For the median country, the long-run fiscal gap reaches 4.7 percentage points of GDP at the 2060 horizon (Figure 1). In ten OECD member states, the required adjustment exceeds 8 percentage points. The gap is negligible (defined as below 0.5 percentage points of GDP) or negative in only three countries – Denmark, Iceland, and Ireland – reflecting strong initial fiscal positions, low net debt, and, in Denmark, statutory retirement ages indexed to life expectancy. Even where long-run fiscal gaps are relatively small, they can represent a substantial challenge. For example, this may still imply stabilising debt at a high level, or run into constraints of already high tax levels.
Figure 1 Long-run fiscal gap at the 2060 horizon
Fiscal adjustment needed from 2027 to keep government debt ratios stable (percentage points of potential GDP)


Note: The chart shows the estimated fiscal adjustment required over the 2027-to-2060 period to keep the gross debt-to-GDP ratio stable near its current value. The underlying projected growth rates, interest rates, etc., are from the Business-as-Usual (BAU1) scenario described in OECD (2025) but updated to use the OECD Economic Outlook 119 database as the starting point. The required fiscal adjustment is decomposed into component parts explained in Guillemette (2026).
Source: Guillemette (2026).
The main sources of these long-run fiscal gaps are weak initial fiscal positions relative to those needed to keep debt-to-GDP ratios stable (contributing 0.9 percentage points of GDP to the long-run fiscal gap in the median country), and population ageing, which raises public expenditure on both pensions (2.2 percentage points in the median country) as well as health and long-term care (1.8 percentage points). Higher defence spending adds to these pressures in many countries (0.5 percentage points in the median country). The gaps could be even higher than shown as future climate-related expenditures are not included.
If higher spending on pensions, health, long-term care, defence, and debt interest is met entirely through additional borrowing rather than by other budgetary offsets, net government debt could rise by 43 percentage points of GDP by 2045 in the median country and much more in some individual countries (Figure 2). These estimates are not forecasts, but they illustrate the pressures that could emerge in the absence of offsetting policy action.
Figure 2 Change in net government debt from 2027 under the assumption of no increase in tax (% of GDP)


Note: The chart shows levels of net government debt as a percentage of GDP in 2027 and 2045 if the level of structural primary revenue as a share of potential GDP remains constant. The underlying projected growth rates, interest rates, etc., are from the Business-as-Usual (BAU1) scenario described in OECD (2025) but updated to use the OECD Economic Outlook 119 database as the starting point.
Source: Guillemette (2026).
The limits of a growth-driven debt reduction
Faced with these challenges, a common refrain in the public debate is that the best cure for our fiscal ills is faster economic growth. However, it is easy to overstate what growth alone is likely to achieve in terms of long-run government debt reduction.
To be sure, in the short run, favourable cyclical conditions can generate substantial reductions in debt-to-GDP ratios. This can occur both through favourable temporary differentials between (nominal) interest rates and growth rates, and through automatic stabilisers boosting cyclical revenue. In an empirical analysis of historical debt reduction episodes in OECD countries, Pina et al. (2026) confirm that favourable cyclical conditions have often been the primary statistical driver of observed declines in debt-to-GDP ratios over short to medium-run horizons.
In the longer run, however, the arithmetic governing the evolution of public debt-to-GDP ratios dictate that they can only sustainably decline through either (1) the real interest rate on public debt remaining persistently below the potential growth rate, (2) structural primary government surpluses, or (3) economic growth, provided the structural primary deficit remains small enough for expanding output to offset it.
Over longer horizons, governments cannot assume that growth will permanently outpace interest rates. Canonical macroeconomic models of the equilibrium real interest rate, such as the Laubach-Williams framework, establish a close relationship between potential GDP growth and real neutral interest rates (Laubach and Williams 2003). Empirical evidence across advanced economies supports the theoretical idea that equilibrium real interest rates co-move with trend economic growth over long horizons (Rachel and Smith 2015, Holston et al. 2017, Del Negro et al. 2019). Consequently, an increase in underlying real growth does not automatically expand the growth-interest differential.
Meanwhile, over long horizons, cyclical components vanish, with the primary fiscal balance converging to its structural counterpart. Thus, a sustained improvement in structural primary fiscal balances is needed in many countries. There again, the contribution that growth can make can easily be overstated.
The source of growth and its interaction with government policies determine its impact on the structural primary balance
The channels through which higher output is achieved and their interaction with government policy settings matter significantly to its fiscal dividends. The OECD modelling framework shows that a reform-driven 10% increase in potential output by 2060 may have negligible effect on the median long-run fiscal gap if that growth is driven entirely by higher labour productivity (Guillemette 2026). This result reflects several underlying mechanisms and policy settings:
- Benefit indexation: Higher labour productivity increases aggregate GDP, but it also raises wages. Meanwhile, social transfers and public pensions are typically directly or indirectly indexed to wage growth, putting upward pressure on expenditure.
- Income elasticity of public services: As real incomes rise through productivity growth, public demand for public goods and services – particularly healthcare and education – tends to increase proportionally or super-proportionally.
- The Baumol cost disease: Productivity growth is generally lower in the labour-intensive public sector than in the private sector. Because wages in the public sector track broader economy-wide wage growth to attract labour, the relative unit cost of providing public services tends to increase over time (Baumol 1967). This relative price effect can exert upward pressure on public expenditure as a share of GDP, muting the positive effects of faster productivity growth on the fiscal balance.
- Long-run revenue neutrality: Higher productivity creates fiscal drag (revenue growth exceeding GDP growth) in the short run, but governments typically choose to adjust tax brackets over long horizons to adjust for this, bringing the tax-to-GDP ratio back down.
Labour utilisation as a fiscal lever
The fiscal outlook can change markedly if higher potential output is generated by increased labour supply rather than higher labour productivity. The OECD Long-Term Model indicates that achieving a 10% increase in the level of potential output by 2060 through higher employment rates than in a baseline scenario could reduce the long-run fiscal gap at this horizon by approximately 2½ percentage points of GDP in the median country. Increasing labour utilisation raises the proportion of active tax contributors relative to social benefit recipients (including pensions), creating a substantial fiscal dividend.
Countries with scope to expand labour utilisation include those with:
- large gaps between male and female labour market participation rates, notably Italy, Belgium, Poland and Korea among those with substantial long-run fiscal gaps (Figure 3) – in many advanced OECD economies, however, female participation is already high, limiting further gains;
- low effective retirement ages, notably Luxembourg, Slovenia and Spain among those with substantial long-run fiscal gaps (Figure 4).
Figure 3 Male and female labour force participation rates
Per cent, from 15 to 74 years, 2025 or latest available year


Note: The labour force participation rate is the ratio between the total labour force (employed and unemployed) divided by the total working-age population. This indicator is measured as a percentage of each age group.
Source: OECD Employment and unemployment by five-year age group and sex – indicators.
Figure 4 Average effective age of labour-market exit and normal retirement age in 2024


Note: Effective labour market exit age is shown for 2024. Normal retirement age is shown for individuals retiring in 2024 after a full career from labour market entry at age 22.
Source: OECD, Pensions at a Glance 2025, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Where the scope to boost labour utilisation is limited, curbing expenditure will be essential to limit fiscal gaps in many countries. Indeed, the empirical literature on successful public debt reductions in advanced economies gives preference to expenditure control over tax increases or cyclical expansions. This is because spending cuts signal structural policy shifts that boost investor confidence and crowd in private investment, leading to minimal recessionary impacts, whereas tax increases can lead to deep and persistent recessions, and growth-driven cyclical windfalls are typically absorbed by political pressure to expand public spending (Alesina et al. 2019). Reductions in debt-to-GDP ratios have typically been associated with fiscal consolidation strategies that alter the composition of public finances – specifically through expenditure restraint that curbs subsidies and slows pension expenditure growth while preserving capital investment and core human capital spending (Pina et al. 2026).
Conclusion
Beyond policy interventions that directly increase labour force utilisation in countries where it remains relatively low, economic growth will not necessarily durably resolve long-run public debt sustainability issues. Over time, public sector wage growth is likely to reflect that in the wider economy, raising the cost of public services. Stabilising public debt ratios and ensuring long-term fiscal sustainability will therefore almost certainly require less generous benefit indexation mechanisms and other reforms to reign in spending .
Source : VOXeu








































































